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Abstract
I voice some concern about Wolgang Welsch's defense of the
theory that animals can feel aesthetic pleasure. My first
concern is epistemological: it is hard to see how we can find
out whether they actually feel such pleasures. My second
concern is conceptual: aesthetic pleasures have intentional
objects and are woven into fallible judgments. It is hard to see
that animals have such objects and can perform such
judgments.
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1. Welsch's theory
In the Forum on "Science in Aesthetics?" in Contemporary
Aesthetics, Wolfgang Welsch tries to rejuvenate Darwin's old
contention that animals feel aesthetic pleasure.[1] Welsch
actually maintains that they can perform aesthetic judgments.
He defines "aesthetic judgment" in the following fashion:
"Aesthetic judgment is essentially a judgment based on
pleasure -- not on a concept or on objective analysis. The
appearance as such must be experienced as pleasurable --
without any need for knowledge of why this is so." The
peahen's excitement at the peacock's display of his plumes is a
case in point. She takes delight in the beauty of his ornament
and performance and nothing else. She performs an aesthetic
judgment. Her delight cannot be reduced to her evaluating the
peacock as being fit and therefore a suitable mate. In actual
fact, a slight variation of the peacock's ornament can reduce or
even destroy the peacock's chances of mating. These slight
changes can hardly mean that the peacock's fitness all of
sudden diminishes dramatically. This points in the direction of
the peahen's perceiving beauty in the ornament and not only a
sign of fitness.
These are very interesting arguments, certainly inspiring, but
alas! not too convincing. Actually, I have two concerns. The
first concern is an epistemological one: the question is, Can we
know that an animal feels aesthetic pleasure? The second
concern is conceptual. The question is, What is the nature of
the concept of aesthetic pleasure? Is this pleasure of such a
kind that it is likely that an animal can have it?
2. The epistemological concern
I will start by voicing my first concern. Welsch does not explain
how we can know that animals feel aesthetic pleasure. And
frankly, I think that is not an easy task. After all, we cannot
talk to the animals, in stark contrast to the kind Dr. Doolittle.
Even assuming that the peahen's excitement is not only caused
by signs of fitness, I cannot see why we ought to draw the
conclusion that the peahen performs an aesthetic judgment.
Maybe there is an unknown X operative in the peahen and
other animals that is neither a reaction to signs of fitness nor a
feeling of aesthetic delight.
My question is: How does person P (or any other person) know
that animal A (or any other animal) feels aesthetic pleasure?
P's knowledge must of course be inferential. Obviously, the
same holds for P's knowledge about the aesthetic delight of
other persons. Now, how does P (or any other person) infer
that person Q (or any other person) is feeling aesthetic
delight? P does so partly by observing the behaviour and the
situational setting of Q, partly by imputing to Q the
same/analogous/related emotions that P himself has felt in
such settings and when P is reacting/behaving in a manner
which reminds him of Q's reactions/behaviour. It seems
intuitively likely that P would have to use the same procedure
in order to determine whether A is feeling aesthetic delight. But
the problems here are in the first place that however difficult it
is for P to imagine how Q experiences aesthetic delight,
common sense tells us that it is even more difficult for him to
imagine how A experiences whatever aesthetic delights it
might feel. How do we know how it feels to be a bat? Well,
there are always the twin problems of if and how we can know
the minds of other persons. The question of how we know
whatever passes for an animal's mind cannot be any less
difficult to answer.
Second, when P determines that Q is feeling aesthetic delight,
the cues that P has are cues closely connected to faces, hands
and language. Let's look at the faces first. We often show
aesthetic delight by ways of smiling, closing our eyes, crying,
having a certain gleam in our eyes, etc. Cues related to the
movement of hands can be the clapping of hands or the
rhythmic movement of a single hand. With the exception of
monkeys, animals neither have faces nor hands; they can
neither smile nor cry. To be sure, they have eyes, but what
would count as an aesthetic gleam in the eyes of an animal? As
I hinted at, linguistic acts can also be telltale signs, for
instance, the uttering of "How beautiful!" in a certain tone of
voice. Sighing or letting out jubilant cries can also be among
the cues. The question is, Has anybody ever heard an animal
give a jubilant cry? As far as we know, animals do not possess
propositional language and can therefore not perform linguistic
acts of the kind mentioned.
This means that P would hardly be able to know whether A
experiences aesthetic delight. A does not seem to have the
means (faces, hands, linguistic skills, etc.) to express such a
delight. And if it had some means, unknown to P, to express it,
it might not be given unto P to understand the nature of the
expression.
Now someone might object to this argument by pointing out
that babies have hands and faces and express delight with
their aid. Many of them show consistent preference for certain
shapes or sounds. I have actually been told that most of them
show preferences for regular shapes over irregular shapes, soft
melody/sound over harsh melody/sound. Is not there anything
aesthetic involved in this response? If not, what drives the
babies to such consistent preferences, my critic might ask. The
trouble with this argument is that we might as well maintain
that the baby's preference for his/her mother's breast over a
lot of other objects is aesthetic. Does that really make sense?
The only thing that we can be certain about when it comes to
babies is that they show preferences for certain objects. But it
is pretty trivial that preferences as such are not necessarily
aesthetic. When it comes to grown up people, we discriminate
typical aesthetic preferences over others reasonably well (I do
not doubt that there is a large grey zone between aesthetic
preferences and other kinds of preferences). If Joan shows all
signs of being curious about the way a complex computer
works and no other side of the machine, we would infer that
her interest in it is not aesthetic.
3. The conceptual concern
This brings us to the very concept of aesthetic pleasure.
Unfortunately, Welsch does not discuss the concept in any
depth. He does not tell us what kind of feeling aesthetic
pleasure is, aside from it being non-conceptual. Therefore, we
must try to provide a rudimentary answer ourselves. There are
least two important types of feelings according to the so-called
the cognitive theory of emotions. Its followers differentiate
emotions on the one hand from sensations on the other. [2]
The latter are raw feelings such as pain or the feeling of
intense well being. The former is supposed to be a much more
complicated phenomenon.
In contrast to a sensation, an emotion cannot be localised in
space. If I have a pain, I feel pain somewhere in my body, but
if I feel fear it would be wrong to say I feel fear in a given
place in my body, though a sensation in, say, my stomach
might arise whenever I feel fear. [3] Emotions are in the first
place intentional and therefore have intentional objects;
secondly they have a propositional content; thirdly they are
about something in the world that can be conceptualised. The
upshot of this is that emotions have a cognitive component.
But the cognitivists have different views concerning the nature
of this component. There are, for instance, some who maintain
that this component is a belief, others think that it is a
construal, i.e., the seeing of something as something else. [4]
Let us look at an example. If I am angry my anger is directed
against someone or something, which is the intentional object
of my anger. If I am angry with John for having allegedly
stolen my car, then the object of my anger is, as Robert C.
Solomon points out, irreducibly that-John-stole-my-car. The
object is not the alleged fact that he stole the car since he may
not have done so. [5] This means that my anger has a
propositional content; it is about something in the world, if not
the real one then at least the world of my fancy. My anger is a
propositional attitude towards a fact expressed in the
proposition 'John stole my car.' This proposition obviously
contains the propositional content of my anger. Notice that we
cannot have propositional attitudes unless we master certain
concepts. In my case, being angry with John for having stolen
my car is not possible unless I master such concepts as ?car?
or ?theft.?
In contrast to this, we can have a sensation like pain without
being able to conceptualise it. Further, a pain does not have an
intentional object; it simply is. The same holds for other
sensations, so knowledge does not play any important role in
our sensations.
The cognitivists are definitely on the right track. And I do not
think that there is any doubt that aesthetic pleasure is an
emotion. The having of a pleasurable sensation alone does not
give us any information whether the pleasure in question is
aesthetic or not. We can feel the pleasurable sensation to
kingdom come without being able to find out what nature the
pleasure has. The same holds for observing the behaviour of
others (including animals), whom we think are experiencing
such a pleasure.
In order to be a pleasure of the aesthetic kind, the feeling must
be a part of a way of experiencing an object (real or imaginary)
as being objects of a certain kind. The object must be
experienced as being, for instance, beautiful, elegant, gracious
or even exciting, entertaining, thought provoking or inspiring.
But if it is experienced, for instance, as being solely a handy
tool, then it is hard to see how it can count as being an
intentional aesthetic object. You might say that it is easy to
find intentional objects, which are not aesthetic. But delimiting
aesthetic objects in a clear-cut manner from other kinds of
objects is a hopeless task. However, there might be some
typical aesthetic object. But this is not our main concern now.
Our basic point is that aesthetic emotions (including pleasure)
get their identity partly from their intentional objects. This also
means that aesthetic pleasure has a judgmental moment. We
will have to judge that the intentional object of the aesthetic
pleasure is of a certain nature. However great the pleasure we
might get out of seeing the instrumental value of a tool, that
pleasure is hardly aesthetic.
I do not doubt that there are those who would object to my
contention that aesthetic pleasure has a judgmental moment.
They might say that both people and animals feel such
pleasures without necessarily performing aesthetic judgments.
Trouble is that such an objection would not help Welsch very
much since he has said in no uncertain words that animals
perform aesthetic judgments. After all, it is Welsch's theories
we are discussing so scrutiny of the aforementioned objection
will be put on hold.
Let us return to the intentional objects once can. Let us take a
look at an example of the way such objects take part in
constituting and differentiating aesthetic emotions. Jim says in
dead earnest about Niagara Falls, "The Falls are so cute." He
obviously either does not understand the meaning of the word
'cute' or perceives the Falls in strange ways. Perceiving them in
a standard way means hearing loud noises, seeing the Falls as
being huge in size and the water as streaming with great
speed. Contrast this to the standard perception of teddy bear,
a typical cute object. Such a bear is perceived as being small,
round, and soft. Now, if Jim perceives the Falls in a standard
way, it would perhaps be more appropriate to say that he
actually thinks they are beautiful, even sublime, and that he
misapplied the concept of 'cuteness' (notice the role played by
concepts in the judgment, in stark contrast to Welsch's view).
Jim has differentiated his aesthetic emotion in a wrong fashion.
Actually, pretty much the same would hold even if he had
consciously been creating a picture of such a falls by an act of
imagination. Judging this daydream falls as being cute would
still be wrong. Admittedly, it would be much harder for others
to find out whether or not this is true than in the case of the
actual Niagara Falls. But Jim could describe the falls of his
fancy to others that could decide whether 'cute' correctly
applies to the description.
From Jim's way of judging the Falls we can learn that
intentional objects take part both in constituting emotions qua
aesthetic ones and in differentiating them further into different
species of this genus of emotion.
Given that Jim's judgment is a typical emotional aesthetic
judgment, then such a judgment is typically fallible. Add to this
the alleged fact that aesthetic pleasure has a judgmental
moment, then we can conclude that aesthetic pleasure has a
fallible moment. I might, for instance, have thought that the
pleasure I felt was aesthetic, but on closer scrutiny I see that I
just felt pleasure by the fact that a certain object was an
obstacle for someone I did not like.
Now the question arises whether animals (or babies) can pass
fallible judgments. Would not passing such judgments require
something akin to a propositional language? And would not the
conceptualising needed for passing judgments like Jim's
likewise require such a language? The question also arises
whether animals can have intentional objects and therefore
emotions. Is the so-called angry dog really angry or is it just
displaying aggression? Is the peahen really feeling aesthetic
pleasure or just reacting to sexual stimuli? Well, it is hotly
debated whether animals (and babies) can have emotions.[6]
Perhaps they could have emotions like fear, anger and joy, but
hardly hope and pride. Maybe aesthetic pleasure is an emotion
uniquely human like hope and pride. Then again I might be
wrong. Possibly animals feel an aesthetic delight different from
ours. But how different can it be and still count as an aesthetic
delight and not some unknown X? I do not doubt that our
aesthetic delights have roots in our animal nature. So do our
abilities to do mathematics. It is thought that they have roots
in our ability to perform spatial discriminations. Nevertheless, it
is pretty farfetched to say that when determining distances,
the chimpanzee is actually performing mathematics.
My conclusion is that we do not have any compelling reasons
to attribute aesthetic delight to animals. It is difficult enough to
prove that grown up human beings can experience such a
delight.
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